If you’re the kind of leader who once watched a late-night news segment about a regional utility’s gas plant go dark for three days because of a “minor IT glitch,” you know how quickly a quiet industrial site can turn into a high-stakes problem. I’ve spent 12 years as a gas plant equipment supplier—walking through hundreds of plants across North America, talking to control room operators, maintenance chiefs, and CISOs— and one truth sticks with me: the biggest threats to a facility aren’t just pipes, pressure valves, or extreme cold. They’re digital gaps no one bothers to seal until it’s too late. When I pull up to a plant, I don’t just check the age of the compressors or the clarity of the utility lines anymore. The first thing I ask is: “When did you last scan your OT network for unpatched devices?” More often than not, the answer is six months, or a year, or never. That’s where the risks start. Gas Plant
Gas plants are uniquely vulnerable because their core operations run on Operational Technology (OT)—the physical systems that control everything from wellhead pressure to pipeline flow to flare stack activation. Unlike office IT, OT devices are built to run 24/7, often for 10, 15, even 20 years, and most were never designed with cybersecurity in mind. A lot of these plants were built before 2010, before ICS (Industrial Control System) security became a standard conversation. Operators used to access the control room only with a physical key; now, they log in from a laptop, a tablet, or even a phone app to adjust valve settings remotely. That convenience is a goldmine for hackers.
Last year, I was at a small gas plant in Ohio where an operator had connected a personal work laptop to the plant’s OT network to download a spreadsheet of maintenance logs. The laptop had a malware that had been picked up from a public Wi-Fi at a coffee shop a month prior. The malware didn’t steal credit cards—it locked the plant’s SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system, freezing all pressure readings for 45 minutes. By the time technicians fixed it, the plant had to shut down temporarily, costing the owner an estimated $120,000 in lost production. That’s the kind of risk that doesn’t make the evening news, but it hits smaller operators just as hard as a large-scale breach. And it’s avoidable if you understand what’s really at stake.
First on the list: unpatched legacy devices. You’d be shocked how many gas plants still run on old PLCs (Programmable Logic Controllers) or RTUs (Remote Terminal Units) that haven’t received a security update since they were installed. These devices were built to prioritize uptime, not protection, and vendors often stopped supporting them years ago. A 2023 report from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) found that 68% of U.S. gas transmission and storage facilities have at least one unpatched critical OT vulnerability on their network. One of the most common flaws I see is default passwords. I once logged into a test account at a plant in Texas using the out-of-the-box password that the manufacturer had set 18 years earlier—something as simple as “admin123” and “password.” That’s like leaving the front gate of a refinery unlocked and then wondering why someone can drive a truck onto the site. Hackers use automated tools that scan the internet for these default credentials 24/7; they’ll find a gas plant’s IP address, guess the password in seconds, and take control of key systems. It doesn’t take a sophisticated hacker to do this—script kiddies with basic online tools can access a plant’s pressure monitoring system and adjust readings to look like everything is normal, even as the actual line pressure spikes.
Then there’s the problem of remote access. Post-pandemic, more and more gas plant teams are working remotely, accessing OT systems from home or on the go. This is a huge win for efficiency—operators don’t have to drive two hours to adjust a valve, and technicians can troubleshoot without being on site. But it’s also a huge risk. I’ve seen plants that allow remote access via unsecure VPNs, or even just an open web portal with two-factor authentication disabled. A lot of these teams think that because the plant is in a remote rural area, it’s not a target. That’s a dangerous myth. Ransomware gangs actively target small to mid-sized gas plants because they’re often less protected than large corporate facilities, and shutting down a plant pays fast. In 2022, a ransomware attack hit a gas plant in Alberta, Canada, locking their SCADA system and demanding $2 million. The plant paid, not because the hackers were brilliant, but because they didn’t have a recent offline backup of their control systems. That’s a choice most small operators make because backing up OT data can be costly, and they think it’s unnecessary—until they need it.
Another risk that’s often overlooked is supply chain vulnerabilities. As a gas plant equipment supplier, I can tell you: every device we sell is part of a larger ecosystem. When a plant buys compressors, flow meters, or monitoring sensors from a third-party vendor, they’re also opening a door to the vendor’s cybersecurity. If that vendor has a breach, and their software has a backdoor, that backdoor can lead straight into the plant’s OT network. Two years ago, a well-known industrial automation vendor had a breach that exposed data from over 100 gas plants across the U.S. The breach wasn’t the plants’ fault—it was the vendor’s failure to patch a software bug in their monitoring tool. That tool was installed on the plants’ SCADA servers, and hackers were able to access not just monitoring data, but also make small adjustments to flow rates. The plants had to disconnect the tool entirely, which created its own problems: they lost real-time data, and had to go back to manual checks every four hours. That’s a catch-22 many plants face: they need the tools to run efficiently, but those tools can also be a weak link.
Physical cybersecurity is often tied to digital risks, too. I’ve visited plants where the control room is in a small, unmarked building that’s only locked during working hours. Overnight, the door is propped open, or a window is cracked, and a trespasser can walk in and plug a malicious USB drive into a control room laptop. It sounds like a movie plot, but it happens. Last year, a plant in Pennsylvania had an incident where a local teen walked into an unlocked control room, plugged a USB drive into an operator’s laptop, and deleted a day’s worth of pressure data. It wasn’t malicious—just a prank—but it took the plant 12 hours to restore the data, and they were fined by the state for missing safety reporting deadlines. That’s the line between physical and digital risk: a small, preventable action can cause huge operational delays and regulatory issues.
Regulatory pressure is also growing, and operators can’t afford to ignore cybersecurity gaps. PHMSA has strict rules for pipeline and gas plant safety, and in recent years, they’ve started including cybersecurity requirements in those rules. In 2024, the agency announced that facilities failing to conduct annual OT vulnerability scans or update access controls could face fines of up to $200,000 per violation. That’s on top of the operational costs I mentioned earlier. A lot of operators think “cybersecurity” is just an IT problem, but at a gas plant, it’s a safety problem, a compliance problem, and a financial problem all rolled into one. If a hacker gains control of a pipeline, it can lead to a leak, an explosion, or an environmental disaster. The Colonial Pipeline attack in 2021 is the most famous example, but it’s not an isolated incident. Between 2020 and 2023, PHMSA documented over 300 cybersecurity-related incidents at U.S. gas facilities, ranging from ransomware to unauthorized access to control systems.
So what can a gas plant do to protect itself? From my time working with these facilities, the answer starts small, and it starts with awareness. First, conduct regular OT vulnerability scans—not just IT scans. Most operators only scan their office computers, but the OT network is where the money and safety are. Second, update default passwords and enable two-factor authentication on every device, even the ones that seem “too old” to matter. There’s no such thing as an unimportant device when it controls gas flow. Third, segment your network. Don’t let your control room network connect to your office Wi-Fi or your internet service. If a hacker gets into the office, they shouldn’t be able to reach the OT systems. Fourth, have offline backups of all critical OT data, stored on a system that’s never connected to the internet. Ransomware can’t encrypt what it can’t access. Fifth, vet every vendor you work with, including equipment suppliers. Ask them about their cybersecurity practices, and make sure they’re following industry standards like ISO 27001 or NIST SP 800-82, which is specifically for industrial control systems.
As a gas plant equipment supplier, this is what I bring to the table: I don’t just sell compressors or flow meters. I work with plant operators to build devices that are secure by design, with built-in encryption and support for security updates for the life of the equipment. I also help with OT network assessments, connecting operators with trusted cybersecurity experts who understand industrial systems, not just office IT. Too many suppliers treat cybersecurity as an afterthought, but at the end of the day, our business depends on your ability to run safely and reliably. When we install equipment at a plant, we don’t just hand over a manual and leave—we train your team on how to keep those devices secure, and we’re available 24/7 if you have a question about a network vulnerability or a suspicious activity alert.
If you’re a gas plant operator, manager, or CISO looking to audit your current cybersecurity posture, or if you’re in the market for new equipment that’s built with OT security in mind, I’d encourage you to reach out. The risks are real, but they’re not unavoidable. The difference between a minor disruption and a major disaster is often just a small investment in securing your most critical systems. Let’s talk about where your plant is vulnerable, and how we can work together to build a safer, more resilient operation.
Specialty Gases References
National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2020). NIST SP 800-82 Revision 2: Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security.
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. (2023). 2022 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Incident Report.
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2022). Industrial Control Systems: Cybersecurity Improvements Needed for Gas Pipeline and Storage Facilities.
International Society of Automation. (2021). Cybersecurity for Industrial Automation and Control Systems: ANSI/ISA-62443 Standard.
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